Partnerships and Information Sharing in President Obama's Executive Order on Cyber Security

President Obama at 2013 SOTU

Yesterday President Obama signed an Executive Order aimed at helping nation harden its critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and introduced it to the nation as part of his State of the Union address.

The Order states, "We can achieve these goals through a partnership with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively develop and implement risk-based standards."

The partnership model has a history of success, and it is prudent to continue and support this model.

The nuclear power industry has an active partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security specifically geared toward enhancing the security of commercial users of nuclear materials.

Under HSPD-7, the industry established the Nuclear Sector Coordinating Council (NSCC), and the government established the Government Coordinating Council (GCC).  These groups meet quarterly under the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework.

The NSCC/GCC provides an instrumental forum for organizations engaging in civilian uses of nuclear materials in the U.S. to discuss security issues and work together with our federal partners to enhance security and resilience.

The order also discusses the importance of information sharing. I could not agree more. The nuclear power industry in the U.S. has a proven record of responding in a timely manner to identified threats to the safe operations of our facilities.


Information sharing is integral to establishing a robust cyber security program. As I discussed in a previous blog post on nuclear power plant cybersecurity, our plants have been actively addressing the cyber threat for over 10 years.

The first questions that must be answered when establishing a security program are:

1. What must be protected?
2. What must it be protected from?

Information sharing has been instrumental in helping us stay on top of what we must be prepared to defend against.

Under the NSCC/GCC framework, the nuclear sector receives quarterly threat briefings at the SECRET level. The DHS also conducts monthly sector-specific unclassified threat briefings.

So, at a high level, the EO is moving in the right direction. But we cannot lose sight of good work already done.

This new emphasis on the adoption of cyber security practices must consider the existing regulatory frameworks and voluntary initiatives that are already in place.Complexity is the enemy of security. Streamlining and minimizing burden on private entities ensures that resources remain available to respond to real threats.

Ensuring that any new cyber security guidance, practices, or policies does not overlap or duplicate existing practices is essential. For addition details, please consult the NEI backgrounder on Cyber Security.

POSTSCRIPT: The Nuclear Energy Institute’s chief nuclear officer and senior vice president, Anthony R. (Tony) Pietrangelo, made the following comment about the cyber security executive order signed Tuesday by President Obama.

Tony Pietrangelo

“Commercial nuclear energy facilities are well protected from possible cyber threats. The nuclear energy industry has been implementing and improving cyber security controls since 2002, and the federal agency that oversees the nation’s nuclear energy facilities—the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—has established regulations that thoroughly monitor and inspect cyber security at all U.S. reactors.

“To ensure our constant readiness, the industry participates with government agencies to be aware of and assess its readiness for emerging cyber threats. Our facilities are essentially cyber islands, in that safety and control systems are not connected to business networks or the Internet. Unlike industries for which two-way data flow is critical, nuclear power plants do not require incoming data flow.

“Nuclear plants also are protected from grid instability, with multiple backup power supplies that provide for safe shutdown of a reactor in the event of a power blackout. Given that the NRC appropriately exercises authority over the protection of nuclear plant systems from potential cyber threats, it would be counterproductive to have dual oversight of these facilities.”

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Nuclear Power Plant Response to the Cyber Threat

Our nation’s commercial nuclear power plants take the cyber threat seriously.  Our industry has been developing and implementing cyber security programs since shortly after the events of September 11, 2001.  The industry’s efforts culminated in a binding industry initiative to implement a cyber security program consistent with the guidance in a document endorsed by the NRC as an acceptable method for establishing a cyber security program.  All plants implemented this program by mid-2008.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is a strong regulator in this area.  The NRC’s efforts to create a cyber security regulatory framework for the plants began shortly after September 11, 2001.  The NRC issued orders after September 11 that required power reactor licensees to implement interim compensatory measures to enhance cyber security at their sites. These security measures required an assessment sufficient to provide protection against the cyber threats at the time of the orders. Subsequently, the NRC amended the Design Basis Treat requirements to include cyber attacks.  In 2009 the NRC ammended their extensive physical protection program regulations to include specific requirements for a cyber security program to protect systems that, if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security or emergency preparedness.

So what does all of this mean?  What have the plants actually done to implement cyber security protective measures in response to the cyber threat?

Every plant submitted a cyber security plan to the NRC that describes how the plant will implement their cyber security program.  The NRC has reviewed and approved each of these plans.

Each plant also submitted an implementation schedule describing the interim milestone actions toward full implementation of the cyber security program.  The NRC has reviewed and approved each of these schedules.  The interim milestones of the schedule prioritize key activities designed to address the most prominent cyber threats to these facilities.

By December 31, 2012, each U.S. nuclear power plant has:

• Isolated key control systems using either air-gaps or robust hardware based isolation devices. As a result, the key safety, security, and power generation equipment at the plants are protected from any network based cyber attacks originating outside the plant.

• Enhanced and implemented robust controls over the use of portable media and equipment.  Where devices like thumb drives, CD’s, and laptops are used to interface with plant equipment, measures are in place to minimize the cyber threat.  These measures include such actions as: minimizing the use of devices that are not maintained at the plant; virus scanning devices both before and after being connected to plant equipment; and, implementing additional measures where the source of the data or device originates outside the plant.  As a result, the plants are well protected from attacks like Stuxnet, that propagated through the use of portable media.

• Enhanced defenses against the insider threat.  Training and insider mitigation programs have been enhanced to include cyber attributes.  Individuals who work with digital plant equipment are subject to increased security screening, cyber security training, and behavioral observation.

• Implemented cyber security controls to protect equipment deemed most essential for the protection of the public health and safety.  While full implementation of cyber security controls for all digital equipment requiring protection will take some time, plants have prioritized the implementation to cover the assets most essential to the public health and safety.

• Implemented measures to maintain the effectiveness of the implemented portions of the program.  These measures include maintaining the equipment described above in the plant configuration management program, ensuring changes to the equipment are performed in a controlled way.  A cyber security impact analysis is performed before making changes to the equipment.  The effectiveness of implemented cyber security controls is periodically assessed, and enhancements made where necessary.  Vulnerability assessments are performed to ensure the cyber security posture of the equipment is maintained.

This week the NRC began inspecting plant’s implementation of these milestones.

The balance of the implementation of the cyber security program is ongoing.  And I look forward to keeping the readers of the blog up-to-speed on advancements.

No cyber security program will be 100% perfect.  These interim measures well position the plants to ensure that the public health and safety are maintained, and that the sites will reliably continue to make their significant contribution to the nation’s electrical supply.

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